• Are Special Wars Really New and Special or Are They Old Dirty Tricks?

    John Schindler, the former NSA official and professor at the US Navy Academy, has a theory of "special wars" — basically running wars like the Russians do in order to be able to fight them.

    Except, I'm quite sure neither he nor any supporters would like that reductive description of the concept.

    I love John Schindler's stuff — don't get me wrong. I always marvel that someone that young who didn't directly fight the Soviets in the dissident trenches understands so much about them and their methods, and is even able to teach others about it methodically. It restores my hope in the NSA after Snowden, which for me, like CableGate, is at least in part about the failure of government to keep out the adversarial hacker culture that accompanies wikification and moving life online.

    Schindler has been absolutely right on Snowden and all things related to it, so I take seriously any theory he comes up with about how to fight the Russians better, especially now that they have really gone full-tilt into enemy mode. I'm all for containment, Cold War, deterrence — the works because all of that is required with this kind of real threat to the West.

    So how hard will it be to put "special war" over politically, given the Obama "progressives" and what is to come if they succeed again in 2016?

    Here's where Schindler first wrote about it at length and more this week since it was covered in the New York Times.

    I've been thinking about it since last year, and have questions about it:

    Ever since I heard of Schindler’s “special war” theory last September, I’ve pondered whether I like it or not — but then, war isn’t something you “like like” – as you do a Facebook kitty. There’s the Catholic theory of “a just war” which should have as its goals the ending of war. Does it fit?

    I wonder how some of its aspects are to be distinguished from what used to be called “CIA dirty tricks” — and maybe it’s not. For those who don’t want to endorse drones and mass killing, “special wars” is an attractive alternative. And indeed, any moral person has to ask why we wouldn’t opt for “special wars” that are more efficient, require much less troops, seem brainier, and are more pin-pointed. That is, a drone might have “collateral damage” or hit women and children or wedding guests while going after the fighters who deliberately mingle among them — there’s lots of angst about drones become of the remoteness of the operation of them. Then massive numbers of troops — as in the “surge” in Afghanistan — that just seems to get lots of our soldiers killed, and not win the war anyway — precisely because we live in the age of “special wars” which the Russians and the Taliban for that matter are really good at.

    So wouldn’t we rather have an intelligence agent parachute in and assassinate the Pakistani ISI operative who is sustaining the Taliban, or infiltrate a political party, or get inside the prime minister’s office, or whatever it is that you do, instead of massing troops around borders and trying to drone away militants. In the old days, that’s what the CIA did, and it worked in some places, but it got a bad rap.

    That’s my question then. Once “special wars” gets going, how will it deal with the bad rap? The Russians and even some Ukrainians think the US has mercenaries parachuted into southeastern Ukraine already (we don’t); what if we start really doing that sort of thing?

    Next, there is so much wrong with the military — scandals in the top leadership, suicides, massacres of civilians, PTSD– as I’ve noted before, I think this is a mismatch between the reality of what war is, and the PR campaign that the armed forces insist on retaining, which implies that you “learn a skill” and “get a job” through the military — meaning that the poor people who come into this setting think their goal is to get a skill and be assured of a job, instead of going into dangerous places and killing people. So that begs the question: can we make “special wars” with *this* army?

    In general, I’d like to see less contractors in the armed services and government in general — most problems we’ve had — think of Snowden – are related to them. So would “special wars” be done with contractors? I think it would be better to have permanent, trained, regular armed services doing this.

    We also need more HUMINT, foreign languages, education — how will that be assured? Can existing academies like West Point create the cadres of the “special wars” or does some other academy have to be created?

    Finally, what about the moral problem of “becoming like them”? The Russians are good at “special wars” because they’re cynical nihilists exploiting illiberal ideas like nationalism or Eurasianism. Can you get good at “special wars” and remain decent?

     

    So basically, it comes down to this: if Schindler means that we should get better at fighting the Russians who use this whole array of Bolshevik methods, from disinformation to masking to lying to agitation and propaganda — by using more counter-intelligence and counter-propaganda, I'm for that. But how much will we be lying, cheating, disinforming, faking, masking, ourselves then?

    Would it involve committing terrorism against civilians?

    That is, I'm for exposing propaganda, calling out lies, vigorously challenging all the bullshit coming out of the Kremlin and broadcasting much more of it than we do. I'm for getting a lot more clever about dealing with this ruthless enemy in the Kremlin. Some of that requires clandestine work that the public will have to take on faith needs to be done, and the less they know about it, the better. But how to get that through in the age of Snowden, where the default of most young people is to distrust government and imagine the US is the greatest evil in the world?

     

     

  • WikiLeaks Propaganda Stunt “Mediastan” Smears, Endangers Local Central Asian Journalists

    Pressure
    WikiLeaks barged into offices all over Central Asia, pressuring independent journalists like these reporters at the highly-respected Asia Plus to instantly sign agreements on WikiLeaks' terms to publish US cables about their country. Here Marat Mamadshoev and a colleague are being told to sign the agreement immediately, but decline.
     

    I'm sickened by Mediastan, the latest propaganda piece by anarchist impresario Julian Assange.

    This is my quick take upon first view of this video (so sorry if there are mistakes or names missing, they will be fixed). It's available for rent ($2.99) or pay $7.00 plus on Vimeo. Naturally, I'm unhappy that I had to give a dime to WL, which I oppose on principle — and I have to wonder how it is that Paypal could agree to accept these payments when it has blocked payments directly from WikiLeaks (and I plan to raise this issue with both Vimeo and PayPal).

    This piece of vile stuff is supposed to be Assange's attempt to provide an "antidote" to a movie about him coming out in theaters October 18 which he doesn't like called The Fifth Estate (it's too critical) which he trying to kill off in various ways.

    Perhaps he's counting on the fact that most people don't know anything about Central Asia, and will merely be impressed that he and his merry band of hacksters caroming around the perilous but picturesque mountain roads of Central Asia — complete with Soviet-style policeman stopping and searching traffic, tunnels under repair until who knows when, and lots of sheep blocking the road — are the coolest of cypherphunk hipsters going on a " journalism" trip through dangerous territory.

    Except it's not at all that. What this journey consists of is a bunch of people from the region whose first names only are given within the film (but see the credits below), and the discredited journalist Johannes Wahlstrom, son of the notorious antisemite and provocateur Israel Shamir. Discredited — because of the tendentious way he has covered Israel-Palestine issues, and disgraced because he is accused of falsifying quotes and of antisemitism.)

    So an unintended bonus is that with Wahlstrom narrating most of the film — when the Great One Himself isn't butting in and pontificating — is that WikiLeaks cannot claim anymore that Shamir and Son don't have anything to do with them and don't represent them. They most surely do, as this film proves.

    Johannes is a Russian speaker because he likely grew up in Russia or at least speaking Russian with his father — who has played a sordid role in the Snowden affair, too, about which you can read on my other blog, Minding Russia. But he and the other handlers or minders or whoever the hell they are really have no sense of this region, whatever their Russian language ability, and burst in aggressively — and disgustingly — to try to strong-arm local news media in dire straits in Central Asia, where there is a huge list of murdered, jailed, disappeared and beaten journalists, into publishing WikiLeaks cables.

    Another bonus is that one of the Russian-speaking journalists on the tour admits openly that he fabricated stories at his job (supposedly because he felt himself to be pressured to do so by  his bosses and their need to sell newspapers) and then was ultimately fired. This is just about the level of journalistic quality we can expect throughout this film.

    (The reason I mixed up Wahlstrom and this Russian in an earlier version of this blog, since corrected is because both are accused of fabrications; the Russian admits it in the film, Wahlstrom denies it. And while some WikiLeaks operative @Troushers is accusing me of "lying" here in my summary of the dialogue of this Russian journalist, I stand by it — indeed he openly admits he fabricated letters and indeed the implication is that he was pressured by his boss, who needed to sell papers even if he didn't say literally that phrase — Internet kids are so literalist. The  obvious reality is, the theme throughout the entire film is that editors and journalists in mainstream media only do things to sell newspapers — i.e. the obvious point of the snarky portrayal of Bill Keller and Sulzberger talking about traffic for a column of Bill's "half supportive" of Obama. Here's the script verbatim from Dmitry Velikovsky, from Russkiy Reporter, who has been active in covering Manning's trial in the past. Russkiy Reporter also sponsored the showing of the film in Moscow.

    Velikovsky: I began with some funny study. I was obliged to edit the column "letters of readers". But the problem was that there were absolutely no letters to edit. But the column should be published twice a day. And so I was obliged to to invent those letters me myself. And I just invented a lot of them.

    Wahlstrom: did you get some, any letters at all from real readers?

    Velikovsky: Yes we got some maybe three, four or five in two months but they were all containing some critics.

    Wahlstrom: but these letters you didn't publish.

    Velikovsky: I wanted to publish those letters in the factual content of the newspaper because I found it rather important to have some kind of self criticism. But our marketing department had no self criticism and they forbid me to publish it. So i invented letters about problems of veterans, problems of pensioners, problems of no matter whom. So that's how I became a journalist.

    Cue tinkly music…

    Astoundingly, this aggressive, beligerent crew have no sense of themselves in this film, so imbued are they with their self-righteousness, even as they beam in Julian Assange on Skype who instructs the locals how they are to treat this material.

    It's very clear WikiLeaks has absolutely no interest in the substance of the local stories, they just want to collect partners — or conversely, shame those potential partners who refuse to deal with them for various reasons by making them look like they are boot-licking lackeys of the United States.

    They tape phone conversations with people that are rather sensitive — like a journalist in danger discussing whether he should publish a story about somebody who wants to run a coup in Tajikistan (!) — and we have no idea if the people involved were informed that these calls would be taped — and included in the film.

    The single most damaging aspect I've seen in this agitprop trash is that the utterly unsupported claim is made that the local press are paid by the US Embassy to print flattering things about the US in order to get the leaders and publics of these countries to bend over while the US uses them as a launching pad and staging area for their war in Afghanistan.

    The WikiLeaks people are too ignorant and blinded by their anti-American ideology to understand that a) the US has no need for this because these countries have cooperated anyway b) these tyrants have their own interests in playing off the US against Russia and China c) it doesn't matter as the US is  pulling out of Afghanistan next year anyway.

    Now, I write as someone who for six years worked at EurasiaNet and Open Society Foundation and wrote critically about the US role in Central Asia, particularly about the severe human rights and humanitarian issues — about which the US government was oftne silent — and the issues around the Northern Distribution Network, the supply path to Afghanistan from Russia which enabled the US to bring non-lethal cargo to NATO troops.

    I probably wrote more than anybody on the WikiLeaks cables in Turkmenistan, strategically located between Iran and Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries with heavy US involvement, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. You can search for all these articles and those of my colleagues here eurasianet.org

    I also worked in the past as a free-lancer for RFE/RL ("(Un)Civil Society" and "Media Matters") and never experienced any censorship — I wrote and published directly to the site. I recall only instances when care was taken in covering mass demonstrations once in Ukraine to make sure that the article didn't incite people — as RFE/RL has a history of being charged with causing uprisings, i.e. in the Hungarian revolution and invasion by Soviet troops. RFE/RL is funded by Congress, but it doesn't have overlords hanging over you as you write — there is far more independent coverage there than anything you'd see at RT.com, the Kremlin-sponsored propaganda outlet or Al Jazeera.

    I have no relationship whatsoever to the US government, so I am certainly qualified to say that this film is an unfair hatchet job on people in harm's way — oh, so typical of WikiLeaks.

    The film opens with the WikiLeaks crew rolling through the mountains with Mehrabanb Fazrollah of Pyandj, Tajikistan, born 18 October 1962, in the back seat of the car telling his story. He was held five years in Guantanamo about which you can read some here.

    Through a series of astoundingly leading questions, broad innuendos or outright promptings, the WL gang incites Fazrollah into saying he really knew nothing of any military significance, and his jailing was all for nothing, and boy is he mad. I don't know anything of his case except what I've read in the papers, but the duplicitious smiles and repeating of what foreigners want to hear are very old stories to me from having traveled in this region (I haven't ever been in Tajikistan but I've spent years travelling to Russia and other countries and interviewing Tajiks outside of Tajikistan).

    Assange claims bitterly that this poor fellow spent five years ""to find out about a couple of fucking refugees in Tajikistan".

    Actually, that's not even what the cable said or even what the man in the film says. They said there were 100,000 refugees. This is relevant of course regarding the Northern Alliance and the Tajiks in Afghanistan. The fellow is charged with membership in the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan (IMT) allied with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group on the American list of terrorist organizations.

    Sorry, but this is not nothing, these are real terrorism movements, even if supposedly in decline (like, you know, Al Shabaab was in decline and chased out of their stronghold when they hit Westgate Mall in Kenya?)

    You would never know from Assange's sneers that this is a country that was in a civil war for years, that it had the highest number of journalists murdered — some 50, nearly as many as Algeria, also in a civil war at the time, that these journalists were killed by Islamists because they were secular or visa versa because they were not approved Muslims killed by state security. The war is a complicated one but to pretend that terrorism and war isn't a factor here — right next to Afghanistan — is absurd.

    This is of course the game, too, of the International Relations Realist school in Washington and elsewhere, who minimize terrorism and laugh it away as a fantasy of Pentagon planners. But the reality is that both are true — real terrorist acts have occurred here and there are in fact real Islamists pressuring secular society including press, and there are also fake terrorists that the oppressive government thinks up to keep itself in power. And you know something? I surely do not trust Julian Assange and his crew of losers to tell the difference.

    I will never forget in my life the terrified face of a Tajik journalist  who had been receiving death threats that I helped rescue from Tajikistan in the 1990s — and it was a brave man going the extra mile inside the US Embassy actually that got him and his family out of there.

    In the film, after reading some cables on Gitmo — and as I said, the cases may be innocent, but the WL goons are hardly the judge, and there are real complex problems of terrorism and pressure on secularism in these countries — Assange and Wahlstrom sit and guffaw about a line in a memo they've found about Bildt getting in touch with Karl Rove instead of really trying to understand the complexities of the region They find this such a smoking gun and so "evil" that they roar for minutes, but we don't get the joke.

    The translator asks outrageously leading questions and they all laughed and carried on and made it clear they sympathized with the Tajik taken from the battlefield from Gitmo and don't interview him impartially or critically at all. In the same way the pick up a memo from someone named Michael Owens, and start roaring about the US "empire of the 21st century" — which is of course a rather lack-luster claim these days — some empire of the 21st century which they are just now leaving, eh?

    Then they read from cables — only partially — with a "scene-setter" — talking about how the Tajiks have "unfailingly" allowed their overflights, which is all they really wanted from them. They then purport to read from a cable implying that these "imperialist Americans" in Dushanbe want to "make the local media more pro-American" and will first plant positive stories in the Russian media, then pay the local media to reprint them in the local  press.

    They don't actually cite from any document or give any source, and it isn't in any known cable from the WikiLeaks Cablegate already published that the US Embassy engages in this practice.

    So without anything to bolster this claim, WikiLeaks smears gazeta.ru, Interfax, and Ekho Moskvy, claiming that they've somehow engaged in this practice.

    It really is an outright lie. I have read the Russian-language press in this region for years. They are critical of the US and there aren't these glowing planted pieces they imagine. And the US doesn't need to engage in such a silly, crude practice.

    First of all, CENTCOM, the US military command for the region of Central Asia, has its own official news service, but more to the point, it has its own supported English- and Russian-language Internet news service everyone knows they are behind as they tell you, that it uses to put stories for the local media  to pick up – where they are identified as such and sourced from this page, not hidden under bylines or mastheads from the indigenous media.

    Secondly, none of these papers in the region have very big readerships — they don't have the capacity. We are talking about newspapers with 50,000 or 100,000 or 500,000 possibly at the most, but more at the low end. It's just not a way to reach people. Internet penetration is very low in some of the countries — it's about 60% in Russia but drops down sharply as you go East.

    The US already has Voice of America as an outlet to cover the perspectives of the US, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty which serves to enhance or enable struggling local media — they have open partnerships with some local stations, and because they are far more independent than the official media of these authoritarian states, they have more credibility. To be sure, RFE/RL are not going to be radically antithetical to the foreign policy of the United States, any more than the BBC or Al Jazeera or RT.com. But unlike Al Jazeera and RT.com, RFE/RL really tries to cover critical local news without fear or favour, and proof of that is just how many journalists have been arrested, jailed or expelled over the decades. The US government doesn't need to crudely pay somebody to hide behind, in other words. But these, too, don't have a huge audience outside the intelligentsia in the big cities.

    The fact is, WikiLeaks has not produced proof of this disreputable claim, because they've cited one cable only partially where it sounds like a proposal that one doesn't know was fulfilled, and in citing another cable, in Kyrgyzstan, it appears that the Kyrgyz foreign minister presents this idea, and that it doesn't come from the Americans.

    To be sure, paid-for press and infomercials and advertorials are rampant in this region in the official and unofficial press. But to claim that these brave independent outlets take payments to portray te US nicely is just an outright smear for which there isn't an iota of proof. It puts these brave people in danger to suggest it.


    (more…)

  • Will the CSTO Be Used to Put down Internal Unrest in Central Asia?

    CSTO meeting 2010
    August 20, 2010. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko(left) , Kyrgyz President
    Roza Otunbayeva, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Armenian
    President Serge Sarkisian at unofficial summit of the leaders of the
    CSTO member states in Yerevan, Armenia © PanARMENIAN Photo / Davit
    Hakobyan

    This was the question addressed by Yulia Nikitina of MGIMO (the Moscow State Institute of International Relations) during her policy memo presentation and discussion at the annual two-day PONARS conference.

    Because I asked it.

    Her talk was actually about "How the CSTO Can (and Cannot) Help NATO" –  given the 2014 withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. "Afghanistan is on its way to becoming a missed opportunity for NATO-CSTO cooperation," she said — and she wasn't really delving into the nature of the CSTO per se and why NATO may not wish this cooperation.

    But naturally, cooperation does hinge on the nature of the CSTO and its intentions.

    Nikitina's talk came just as a summit of the CSTO was completed, and a statement was released that the security group did not plan to add more troops to Tajikistan, but planned to help Tajikistan "strengthen its border" in light of 2014.

    To put this in perspective, think of 6,000 Russian troops already in Tajikistan, considerable wrangling still over how much Russia will pay Tajikistan for its base there and other arrangements, and a border more than 1,000 kilometers long. 

    The numbers of troops available in the CSTO — which Uzbekistan has not joined — is not officially released, but here's what Nikitina has to say: 

    In 2012, hard security issues disappeared from the agenda of potential CSTO-NATO cooperation. They were replaced by an emphasis on conflict resolution and crisis management, to which in 2013 peacekeeping was added. But what specifically can the CSTO offer in the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping?

    The CSTO has four types of collective forces. These include two regional groups of military forces (Russia-Belarus and Russia-Armenia), prepared to react to external military aggression; a 4,000-strong Collective Rapid Deployment Force for Central Asia; a 20,000-strong Collective Rapid Reaction Force (both of which have been designed to react to crises short of interstate conflicts); and collective peacekeeping forces, including about 3,500 soldiers and military officers and more than 800 civilian police officers (exact figures for all types of forces are not publicly available).

    So the last "collective peace-keeping forces" which isn't the same thing as the Collective Rapid Deployment Force, has 4,300 troops, but roughtly a fifth of them are civilian police officers. Interesting.

    Basically, my question was this (with some explanation in parentheses):

    In 2010, during the pogroms in southern Kyrgyzstan in Osh and Jalalabad, then-acting President Otunbayeva reportedly asked the CSTO to come in and help restore order. (At least 400 people were killed in these ethnic riots, thousands injured, and hundreds of thousands displaced, many temporarily to neighbouring Uzbekistan.)

    All along before then, the CSTO said they were not designed to handle internal unrest, and that was not their purpose, but they were asked anyway, and we know there were emergency meetings about this question in Kyrgyzstan.

    I had understood from talking to some diplomats that Uzbekistan opposed having the CSTO deployed in its "back yard" so to speak (as they disliked the encroachment of what they saw as a Russian-dominated entity – and that's why they refuse to join it – in a neighbour that already had several Russian bases and at that time the US base as well in Manas.)

    So the CSTO was not deployed in Kyrgyzstan (and I could add that the effort to get some 50 police from the OSCE countries to deploy for "technical assistance" to the Kyrgyz authorities was also pretty much demolished because the all-powerful mayor of Osh did not want foreign meddling and Bishkek did not have control  over him).

    In any event, after these tragic events, this question was further discussed and in due course, you heard CSTO head Borduzhya and even Foreign Minister Lavrov speak of adding the competency to address mass unrest to the tasks of the CSTO.

    Will they? I also asked if these troops could be deployed in Tajikistan, where an armed
    group was involved in clashes with law enforcement in which 30 or more
    were killed last year.

    Likely there are others more knowledgeable about the details but I think it's good to ask Russians directly about this because they don't seem to want to define either what "extremism" is or what "unrest" is or anything about this.

    I expected, since there was a news story out in Izvestiya, that this would get a "normal" answer, much like the last paragraph of this article, which reflected the official view:

    Vladimir Putin also proposed using the CSTO forces in the capacity of peace-keeping forces.

    This was first discussed after June 2010, during the period of inter-ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan, when CSTO forces could not interfere in the conflict due to the absence of legal mechanisms.

    Of course, peace-keeping and unrest-stopping are really different things as the UN endlessly learns to its chagrin — but I thought I'd ask.

    That Izvestiya piece made it sound like it was a mere absence of legal mechanisms, although we knew it was both an absence of political will (on Russia's part) and an unwillingness to have deployment encroaching sovereignty on others' part.

    In any event, Nikitina replied with that tone of prickly, moral-equivalency high dudgeon that seems to characterize so many interactions with the official Russian intelligentsia these days.

    She said she often got this sort of question and "just couldn't understand it". After all, no one expected NATO to go to the south of France in 2005, she noted tartly. You can't just have military alliances going hither and yon, and so on.

    It wasn't the sort of format where I could object that NATO wasn't invited to the south of France, and 400 people weren't killed in the south of France, and half a million didn't flee over the border, either.

    In any event, she said she didn't know about Uzbekistan objecting, but in fact, she said, Belarus objected. (I had never heard that before).

    Belarus said that it would be hard to tell the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks apart, Nikitina noted. I would like to think that what Belarus meant by this was not that "all Central Asians look alike" but that civilians and marauders would be hard to tell apart.

    Of course, you could start just by separating, oh, the men riding around in police or army vehicles that mysteriously seemed to become available to them, wielding guns also mysteriously obtained, and stop them from going into places with women in scarves carrying young children and fleeing in panic. That should be fairly easy to "tell apart". In any event, urban hand-to-hand combat is a difficult setting and I'm not going to tell the military or police their business. I really don't know if Russian-led troops swooping into Osh might have made a difference — especially if they didn't have a robust Chapter 7 equivalent sort of mandate to actually battle the pogromshchiki. I can't imagine that the attitude toward Russian-led forces would be intrinsically welcoming, either, although Otunbayeva, herself educated in Moscow, reportedly did ask.

    In any event, I also asked Nikitina if 4000 troops was enough to do the job. She didn't answer. The thrust of what she replied — and I await the videotape — was that while response to disorders and/or extremist attacks was now in the remit of the CSTO, it was mainly about inter-state interactions.

    She also stressed that the involvement of the CSTO in a domestic matter could only be at the invitation of the country itself.

    I do think we are not back to a Warsaw Pact type of situation where the need to protect peace-loving fraternal socialist peoples serve as an excuse to do something like invade Czechoslovakia.

    Of course, what we don't know is what would happen if there was a situation such as has occurred in Kyrgyzstan, where mobs end up toppling corrupt governments, sometimes it seems with some very skilled help (those sharpshooters you can see in some videos skilfully hiding behind trees and moving to scale fences didn't get those bazookas out of a tulip bed).

    i.e. if Russian special forces stealthily took down a government, mixing in with mobs, and then whistled for the CSTO to put down any one objecting.

    Or a scenario like in Moscow itself in August 1991, where one government leader is spirited far away and kept under house arrest, and an illegitimate coup plotters' committee appears, and then another government leader comes on tanks and defeats the coup plot but deposes the leader taken into exile. See, any one of those figures could be whistling for a CSTO. Then what? Which are the fraternal peace-loving peoples?

    Nikitina seemed to indicate that invitations for such deployment might only be a remote possibility.

    There are other troubles — Uzbekistan isn't in the CSTO, and Nazarbayev, head of Kazakhstan didn't come to the summit, even though he wasn't sick and ended up having meetings at home and then going to Monaco. Monaco?! What's that about? "I could have come and chatted with all of you about what we're going to do when hordes of terrorists come pouring over the Afghan border into our countries and destabilize us in 2014, but instead, I chose to go speak to the Prince."

    Says Izvestiya:

    President Nazarbayev’s presence was important; after all the foundation for the military component of the CSTO is the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF). These are the divisions that will actively participate in various operations. For now, the lion’s share of the CRRF are made up of Russian and Kazakh soldiers.

     All of this requires further watching and research. Where have there been Russian "peace-keepers"? Well, in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia.

    How would the CSTO peace-keep? Like ECOWAS or the African Union?

    Thinking of all the cases of violent unrest in Central Asia in the last 20 years, Andijan stands out as the worst or among the worst — and Uzbekistan is not part of the reaction force or the peace-keeping force (I'd love to know more about how they differ). Kyrgyzstan is part of the CSTO, but there is already this precedent where it wasn't deployed because of objections and difficulties.

    So where would the CSTO be deployed? Tajikistan?

     
    CSTO Summit PanArmenian

    CSTO summit 2010, photo by PanARMENIAN.

  • No, the US Will Not Use Tajikistan as Its Back Yard Leaving Afghanistan

    Blake on BBC
    Blake gives an interview to the BBC in March 2012 during a trip to Dushanbe. Photo by US Embassy Dushanbe.

    So here we have it now (distributed today), so we don't just have to listen to Russian analyst speculation or my newsletter, we can hear it from the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia himself, in answer to some journalists in Dushanbe:

    No, the US will not use Tajikistan as its backyard or a doormat on its way out of Afghanistan.

    But really, the next questions for the journalists to have asked, if they had had an opportunity before the Assistant Secretary was whisked away on the tarmac, would be something like these:

    o But is the US training special ops teams or intelligence-related personnel or troops so that we have a close working relationship with the oppressive government of Tajikistan regarding post-withdrawal Afghanistan?

    o But just how many US troops and advisers will remain in Tajikistan, and will this number grow, and will there be any kind of informal cooperation with the abusive government of Tajikistan around something like Ayni or any other location?

    o But does the US feel that it is constrained by the presence of Russian troops and Russian plans/intentions regarding Tajikistan?

    o Say, why *won't* the operation take place through Tajikistan, but takes place through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and of course Russia (60% of the NDN chokehold is in Russia)? Is life about choices among Eurasian tyrants or are there logistical issues with road or rail conditions or something?

    o Could you be more specific then, if you aren't literally going to run the US troops backward out of Tajikistan, and you aren't going to literally help Tajikistan through the base in Ayni, what *will* you will be doing militarily in terms of helping the authoritarian government of Tajikistan to have stability?

    o What do you define as "stability"?

    Remarks

    Robert O. Blake, Jr.
    Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
    Palace of Nations
    Dushanbe, Tajikistan
    February 20, 2013


     

    Assistant Secretary Blake:
    Well good evening everyone. I’ve just concluded a very productive
    meeting with his Excellency President Rahmon. I had the opportunity to
    thank President Rahmon for his very strong support of stabilization
    efforts in Afghanistan and for his strong support of the U.S. and
    international coalition efforts in Afghanistan. We discussed how we can
    continue to strengthen our cooperation in the areas of border security,
    counterterrorism, and counternarcotics. I congratulated President Rahmon
    on the progress that Tajikistan has made in its efforts to join the
    World Trade Organization that will occur very soon and I remarked that
    this will be an important step in facilitating trade and regional
    integration in this region. We also discussed the importance of free,
    transparent and fair elections in the elections that will take place in
    November; as well as the importance of allowing space for
    nongovernmental organizations, for journalists, and for other members of
    civil society. I will be giving a press conference tomorrow but I’ll be
    glad to take one or two questions now.

    Question: Did you have a chance to discuss with the President,
    issues related to military cooperation, in particular, using the
    territory of Tajikistan for transportation of some cargo for
    Afghanistan, for some joint cooperation there? Did you discuss issues of
    the use of one of our airports in the remote region of Ayni for the use
    of military operations and for the purposes of military cooperation
    with Afghanistan?

    Assistant Secretary Blake: No, we didn’t discuss any use of
    any Tajik airport either now or in the future but we did discuss, in
    general, our cooperation on Afghanistan and again particularly the
    importance of continuing to strengthen our cooperation in the areas of
    border security and counternarcotics and counterterrorism particularly
    now that this very important transition in Afghanistan is beginning.
    I’ll take one more question.

    Question [BBC/Tajikistan]: Does the U.S. government have an
    intention to withdraw its troops very soon through the territory of
    Tajikistan and if yes, how will Tajikistan benefit from it?

    Assistant Secretary Blake: No, as you all know, the President
    of the United States announced during his State of the Union speech that
    the United States would be halving the number of troops in Afghanistan
    by February of next year, but I don’t expect that that operation will
    take place through Tajikistan. But nonetheless I do want to express our
    support for Tajikistan’s efforts to help the stabilization for
    Afghanistan and we very much count on those efforts continuing. And
    again, I’ll be glad to take your questions tomorrow. Thank you very
    much.

  • Why are the Registanis Holding a Conference about Regime Change in Uzbekistan?

    Why is Registan having a conference on regime change in Uzbekistan today?!

    Conference on Potential Regime Change and Its Consequences

    API Will Hold a Conference on Human Rights Violations, Forced Child Labor and Potential Regime Change in Uzbekistan, January 19th 2013 at Seattle University, Boeing Room 10 a.m. Admission is FREE

    Our Impressive Speakers List Includes:
    Sanjar Umarov, Founder of Sunshine Coalition
    Nathan Hamm, Founder of Registan.net
    Sarah Kendzior, Writer at Al Jazeera
    Ruslan Nurullaev, Projects Coordinator at API
    Bahodir Choriyev, Founder of the Birdamlik Movement
    Aziz Yuldashev, Executive Director of API
    Dmitriy Nurullayev, Founder of API

    If you saw their October conference, it was about stability, not regime change. Stability is what the New Realists want in these regions, with American help.

    Why do I call them the New Realists and not just "realists"? Because I think if they are a new generation and a new school of thought you have to call them "New"; realists of the past, like the liberal realists who challenged the radical Marxists in the Vietnam era were not the same thing. Robert S. McNamara, the longest serving Secretary of Defense, may have opposed the Vietnam war, and later been friendly to the Soviets in the perestroika era at the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity, but he both respected the Domino Theory in the beginning and also wouldn't defend drones if he were alive today. That's why he isn't exactly the political godfather of Joshua Foust.

    I think it doesn't hurt if they echo the 1960s Nouveau Realism because they are also contrived and artistic in their presentation of the story. I may think up a better term as I go along but this will do for now.

    Nathan Hamm works for a defense consulting company; Joshua Foust used to work for defense contractors and now works at a defense policy think-tank with John Kerry on the board called American Security Project. The other academics they have gathered around them might be more or less slavish to the Registani line, but they are joined by their "realism" about this region — which can mean different things on different days — and in my view, is itself a construct than can rival the construct of the "Neo-Cons" and leaves them without a backup plan when changes occur without them.

    Foust is infamous for launching a series of vicious and vitriolic attacks on various high-profile human rights advocates and nonprofit journalists at EurasiaNet.org   He spent more than a year trashing them for their critique of Gulnara Karimova, daughter of the dictator, and for any of their critical reporting on Uzbekistan and invocation of the Northern Distribution Network as a development that was making the US become craven to dictators and forego human rights advocacy, or so the theory goes.

    Then, possibly after a lot of pushback from these different groups, Foust began to trim his Twitter rhetoric but continue to harrumph about unrealistic democracy promoters, and of course Registan office wife Sarah Kendzior was able to supply the intellectual underpinnings for why nobody should bother with dissidents.

    Stop talking about civil society! She orders. This is like Katy Pearce telling people to shut up and use the hashtag she thinks they should on Twitter. Maybe she will talk some about civil society at this conference, but no one except the in-group will hear.

    Sarah often does a strange little dance on Twitter. Foust will make some outrageous comment. She will respond with some little statement of fact or different opinion that tends to mitigate what Foust just said. One can almost hear the dulcet tones of June Cleaver. Foust never, ever answers her. She then never pushes with her obvious factual point or slightly contrary opinion to continue to argue with his outrageousness. She lets him go time and again and he never feels he has to answer her. That way she's on the record "in the community" as having said the factual thing everyone thought when they saw Foust's little outrage; he gets to save face, however, by never really truly being challenged by his fellow School of Thought member. Nice work if you can get it — and they did get that work.

    I don't know who/what gave them a new infusion of cash, but that's how they were able to have their October "stability" conference.

    So what's up here with "regime change"?

    I'll cut to the chase and I think that the Pentagon/defense contractors/defense think-tank world that these people move in are now getting to the point where they are willing to think about shedding Karimov.

    Karimov is useful to them until 2014. After 2014, he is not useful. They need to get people and armaments and equipment out of Afghanistan because it's expensive, the budget-crunched US military needs it, and they don't want it to "fall into the wrong hands". While they are always dancing around giving the Central Asian tyrants more military aid, it stops short of lethal aid of the actual helicopter/tank sort because they are not authorized even in the current language of their exceptions, in light of Leahy, and because they don't have an objective need apparently to arm up these folks.

    It may also be the case that if they rattle the sabers, so to speak, and invoke their possible power to help with regime change (which I actually doubt they have), they can get what they want in the End Game before 2014.

    Registani types are all around these defense contractors, but what about Awareness Projects and Sanjar Umarov?

    I have a lot of respect for Umarov, who is a determined opposition leader and former political prisoner who endured enormous suffering and has survived to tell the tale.

    I have some differences from him, namely his claim, made in a New York Times interview, that only lower-level Interior Ministry officials are involved in torture, and that it is not sanctioned from the very top, and that we can convince them to stop.

    While this or that individual police investigator may make decisions to torture in this or that case, and maybe pressure could get them to stop, I think it is sanctioned from the highest level. I believe the Andijan massacre was sanctioned by Karimov and all overall directions of the use of torture are sanctioned by him. That's how these societies work, with incredible top-down vertikal management; to try to cordon off the top leadership and pretend they might become better if we just reform the lower or middle levels is a strategy that might buy someone longer life, but I think it's misguided and possibly deliberately misleading, I don't know. 

    Umarov headed the Sunshine Party which seems one of the more credible non-violent and non-extreme opposition groups, but I am happy to hear other opinions. I'm not an expert on Uzbekistan; I speak Russian but not Uzbek. I'm just somebody who has taken an interest in the country, blogged about it for years for EurasiaNet and also worked for the Cotton Campaign. I care about human rights there and have worked on cases there in various ways. I've never been to Uzbekistan and I don't plan to go any time soon. I'm not so different than the Registanis in that respect, however, because they don't go there, either.

    Umarov has run a logistics and transport business and evidently came in to contact with the US and the NDN practitioners in that capacity. We don't know publicly what the rest of that relationship might mean but there is private speculation about it. It doesn't matter to me if Umarov helped the US and now they helped him get out of the country and support, ideologically or even financially, his opposition work: that's exactly what they *should* be doing and it is *legitimate*.

    Awareness Projects don't say who they get their funding from, although they have a button that anyone can click on and make donations on the Internet. It isn't any wealthy group; it appears to be run by Uzbek students forced to remain in this country and some professors and religious leaders. It's exactly the kind of group we need more of for this region, even if I don't agree with everything they do or say.

    The mission statement of Awareness Projects (which isn't just limited to Uzbekistan) gives you a sense that they might have a "realist" and "incremental" approach to the problems presented by authoritarianism in Central Asia:

    Our mission is to empower communities to face global challenges through small-scale, sustainable, educational projects. Our areas of focus include: promoting healthcare awareness, human rights initiatives, and climate change consciousness. API empowers communities to address these issues using localized programs and resources. We take an innovative, micro focused approach while maintaining a global perspective.

    I don't like the word "empower". I don't believe anybody in the country or abroad "empowers" anything. They have to find their own sources of power or they are doomed. I say that not as a New Realistic, but as a classic liberal student of civil society, that is very hard to manufacture abroad.

    Like USAID,  API has figured out that the milder issues of AIDS prevention or "climate change" environmental work may "pass" more easily with these regimes and with their timid subjects — "micro" is always better to gain reassurance that you don't mean to topple the regime, so the thinking goes (I don't buy that approach myself although if somebody wants to try it, let them, as long as they don't keep bashing sturdier and more confrontational human rights projects — which is what these types often do.)

    So why are they yapping about regime change with an old dictator who has probably already cunningly locked up his succession to make sure it's just a clone of him and his policies?

    Perhaps they really think Karimov is about to topple, either keel over from death or incapacitation from sickness, or they'd like him to think they think that.

    Registan adopted Dmitriy Nurullayev when he decided to remain here rather than returning to Uzbekistan after claiming that he faced a threat of imprisonment. These kinds of threats are common and the story is credible, but I did ask questions about it.

    I don't know why the organizers left out groups like Human Rights Watch (Steve Swerdlow) and International Crisis Group (Andrew Strohlein, who is actually moving to HRW now, regrettably depriving the landscape of some diversity and competition). Maybe those groups wouldn't come to something with Registan leaders in it because of how nasty they were in the past to them. Maybe the organizers themselves think micro-projects rather than in-your-face human rights work is the way to go — I just don't know. I ask questions.

    To be sure, topics include forced child labour in the cotton fields — a topic the regime accepts in principle and says it is "working on" and has signed the appropriate international treaties banning it. So maybe this area will be covered in full, although they really aren't the center of gravity for Registan.

    The conference also features Birdamlik leader Bahodir Choriyev. Birdamlik is an opposition group that tries bravely to demonstrate against the regime. Bahodir often invites me to join his groups or pages. I don't simply because I'm not interested in becoming a member of an Uzbek opposition group, I'm not in the Uzbek opposition even though obviously I oppose Karimov and company. They need to make their own opposition inside the country, with help from abroad, as best they can, but it's not my area of expertise. Actually, I even turned down a request to join a Russian opposition group in exile recently, where at least I speak the language and have years of working in the country and following the issues. I think it was because they were going to make me to a lot of work, and I already have enough volunteer activities.

    I have to say that Choriyev seemed rather naive, or perhaps simply overly determined, when he returned to Uzbekistan — naturally the goons got to him eventually. But I suppose that had the added benefit of convincing all those USAID types that "realism" is in order regarding this regime.

    New Eurasia, a site for which I have as little respect as I do for Registan, covers the activities of this group.

    I'm all for protests against this regime, it's important to keep visible here in the US and Europe especially when the regime officials visit. I'm all for 1,000 flowers blooming, but I'm certain we're not seeing a big range of flowers at the Awareness conference with only Registani speakers. I look forward to a much wider range of organizations, such as NED, Freedom House, etc. to hold conferences about whither the regime and Uzbekistan in 2015.

     

     

    The site has a poll: With the new elected president in 2015, the situation will be better, worse, the same.

    I voted "the same," but found that most people believe it will be "better". Why they think this president will be "elected" in some kind of authentic way within only two years from now is beyond me, but one lives in hope.

    Evidently this conference is under "Chatham House Rules" (which, if people were less pretentious, they could call "Council on Foreign Relations" rules), i.e. no papers or transcripts will be published — as they weren't with the October conference. So if you aren't in Seattle or didn't get your way paid there, you're out of luck.

     

     

     

  • “I Have a Drone”

    If watch this Obama "99 Problems" Jay-Z parody, you'll never forget that catchy bit at the end, where first Martin Luther King says "I have a dream," then Obama is set up to say "I have a drone."

    Today the Daily Mail has a sensational piece posted with bloody pictures of drone victims, talking about how CIA chiefs "face arrest" over their drone misfires.

    The Mail on Sunday today reveals shocking new evidence of the full horrific impact of US drone attacks in Pakistan.

    A damning dossier assembled from exhaustive research into  the strikes’ targets sets out in heartbreaking detail the deaths of teachers, students and Pakistani policemen. It also describes how bereaved relatives are forced to gather their loved ones’ dismembered body parts in the aftermath of strikes.

    The Telegraph is a little more sedate in explaining that the lawyer I heard speak in New York at the UN Church Center, Shahid Akbar, is suing on behalf of his clients.

    The son of a Pakistani man killed in a strike in Waziristan last year has brought an action against the Foreign Office in an attempt to make it state publicly whether it provides intelligence to the United States for drone attacks.

    Warfare. Lawfare?

    I do believe that drones as I've written are essentially immoral because of the removal and distance from the target and because of the apparently high level of collateral damage, despite the claims of precision.

    To be sure, this new round of actions and articles is based on the same information we've had for months, estimating the roughly "400-800" civilians that may have been killed in the 3,000 strikes — and there is no new sources to corroborate this information. That means that critics pounce on this scarcity of sources, and that even when prestigious individuals like Columbia law students write reports asking questions about drones, if they don't use anything but this one source, they are opening themselves up to Faustian jousting.

    Having heard Akbar speak and having asked him a number of questions, I have no reason not to take what he is saying at face value. He himself was precise in his reporting, and stuck to the story of his clients, not exaggerating, and not indulging in the rhetoric and politics of his sponsors on the US speaking tour, CODE PINK.  When I asked him how many people were injured, as opposed to killed, and was there a higher number as there are with land mines, he matter-of-factly acknowledged that no, drones are more precise and therefore injure less people, and kill their targets — the issue is that there often other people near them like family members.

    Today Suzanne Nossel, the Executive Director of Amnesty International USA put out an urgent e-mail alert regarding drones in connection with the presidential elections, in the hope that either or both candidates would mention them in the debates tonight:

    There are many things we don't know about U.S. drone policy, for
    example, the government's rules of engagement for drone attacks. Drone
    missions and strategy operate under a shroud of secrecy. But what we do
    know is scary — the deliberate killing of individuals deemed by the
    U.S. government to be terrorism suspects, far from any recognized
    battlefield and without charge or trial, raises grave concerns that the
    U.S. is committing extrajudicial executions in violation of
    international human rights law.

    Tell the Obama administration to come clean about its drone policy and put an end to unlawful killings with drones.

    This is an interesting development; Nossel, who formerly served in the Obama Administration in the international organizations department of the State Department, working on the UN Human Rights Council in particular, has been accused by leftists of somehow being tied to Obama's drone policy merely by being in the Administration.

    This is unfair, as Nossel worked for two years in human rights, not in the Pentagon and was unrelated to drones. Even so, the mere presence in the evil Amerikan imperialist power is enough to set off these haters.

    Amnesty — which decides policies like this at its London HQ, not in the US — has decided that killing people extrajudicially in a war without a trial is itself a human rights crime.

    That's definitely a topic for debate, as the counterfactual for these human rights groups is that in fact, war isn't illegal; it just has to be fought by rules. Those rules include not killing civilians. It's odd — would Amnesty accept a uniformed soldier killing another uniformed soldier in a war, say, over an invasion of a country, or an unprovoked attack, but it would not accept that same state killing a terrorist not in uniform, a non-state actor, who had launched that attack hosted from a country?

    This is part of that whole school of thinking — for which Obama is famous — of conceiving of terrorism as a crime, an offense in the criminal code, a police matter, and not a matter of warfare.

    In any event, the operative point here is the shroud of secrecy. Victims of mistakes by US military air attacks get compensation from the US. But drone victims don't — because the program is secret. So at a minimum the program should not be run by the CIA — since when is the CIA engaged in massive, direct armed warfare, as distinct from intelligence gathering — and the occasional extradicial assassination for which it usually faces reproaches? I will let people like Scott Horton or Ken Anderson figuire out what is legal and illegal here about the CIA, but it seems that secret programs that target people abroad — and then miss — are fraught with problems and violations of human rights.

    Akbar noted that he does not take up the cases of militants injured by drones or of relatives seeking compensation for militants killed by drones — although he believes someone should defend them. Yet he also described how hard it was to tell who the militants were — making that seem like NATO's problem, not his, i.e. they make mistakes because they can't tell a 15-year-old boy or a male who just happens to be at a militant's home apart from an armed militant. But yet he makes the claim that he can distinguish militants enough not to accept them as clients. Well, there it is.

    What I think is key here is focusing on victims, because focusing on militants is a hall of mirrors. First identifying who really is a victim, as distinct from a combatant, and then focusing on justice for them — and prevention of new ones. And even if you can't tell who the militants are per se, you can tell a 7-year-old whose legs are blown off, or an unarmed 15-year-old whose eye is lost, from an armed adult.

    The cynics and the pragmatists trying to be useful to the Administration and get positions with power , like Joshua Foust or Christine Fair, either get all meta and say that the real problem is government itself and its whole architecture of wars, or get all concern-troll and say that drones are regrettably necessary in a situation where ground troops invading areas like the tribal territories would lead to huge numbers of civilian and military casualties.

    I think it's more than fine to keep asking questions about deadly drones, just like nuclear bombs, and keep demanding an end to secrecy and justice for victims.

    And that's what CODE PINK has been doing, of course, but in a very one-sided fashion, as has been noted by a number of people — certainly more on social media these days than in the old days, when the one-sided pro-Soviet nature of these groups would go virtually unchallenged except for a handful of faith groups and conscientious objectors.

    Meredith Tax of the Center for Secular Space is bravely trying to fight this one-sidedness on her blog and at Open Democracy, and maintain a critique both of the US drone program and its alarming impact in Pakistan, but also condemn the Taliban, and Pakistan's support of it.

    Brave, because to post on Open Democracy means to be endlessly nettled by British Islamists who drive away any liberal human rights writer there who criticizes anything about fundamentalist Islam as somehow in the pay of that evil Amerika I mentioned. (It isn't even that they are what drives you away; what drives you away is the bad faith of the moderators and the refusal of people to counter the haters.)e

    I see that infamous cantloginas_Momo — who is the evidently banned Momo back on an alt that the moderators can't see their way clear to banning — is still trying to bedevil people trying to be even-handed like Meredith. I remember years ago wasting time on him. Time justified only if there are young people looking over his shoulder who may still be reached with reason.

    And that's why I don't go to Open Democracy much anymore — I know that you will face anonymous ankle-biters like Momo who just endlessly heckle and harass, and few people come to defense of the liberal values that supposedly OD represents. OD also tilts to the left, and just isn't my thing. It's a shame, as there aren't very many sites that cover human rights, and cover it without the really leftist bias of Democracy Now. OD is critical of Russia, which the American left seldom takes on.

    The discussion among feminists — pro and con regarding CODE PINK and charges of one-sidedness — is far more interesting and productive than the one dominated by Momo as per usual at OD. So join in here.

     

  • “Great Gain, Not Great Game” — But Increased Militarization?

    EXBS
    Mitsubishi ATV given by US in EXBS Vehicle Donation program to Uzbek Institute of Nuclear Physics

    Argh, who writes these lines?

    Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asia Robert O. Blake, Jr. put out the transcript of a speech yesterday made at Indiana University's Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center  titled Toward a Great Gain, Not a New Great Game. OK, who profits, as Lenin would say?

    Most of the references to human rights are generics, but there's this:

    It is important to note that we always take into account the political,
    economic, military and human rights situation of a partner country when
    deciding what kind of security cooperation to pursue. As an example, we
    provide only non-lethal assistance to Uzbekistan because of our concerns
    about its human rights record. But we continue to engage, making it
    clear that our relationship can reach its full potential only when
    Uzbekistan meets its human rights obligations.

    Non-lethal, but still military, i.e. still assistance to police and troops that might be directly or indirectly, as a system, part of human rights abuse. I don't believe human rights and democracy "rub off" from training, and that those kinds of exercises are mainly fallacious and at best, aspirational — and really more about having contacts with regimes so that when all hell breaks loose you have people to talk to. Or even before all hell breaks loose — in another program, the US supplies vehicles to the IUzbek nuclear institute to be able to zip around and monitor radiation at borders. During the presentation ceremony in July, Amb. George Krol explained:

    The U.S. and Uzbekistan are partners in the fight against
    transnational threats including international terrorism and the
    proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The problem of
    proliferation and trafficking of illicit materials is not just a problem
    for our two countries but for the world, and the work performed by
    Uzbekistan’s Institute of Nuclear Physics is vital to making the world
    safer.

    These Mitsubishis are donated for "the war on terror," and are hopefully used for their intended purpose — if used wrongfully, it's more likely they wouldn't be involved in cracking down on dissidents so much as driving groceries home. But speculation that the US might leave military vehicles or equipment (or more seriously, sell arms) remains — and there's nothing wrong with continuing to watch this with that speculation in mind, because it could happen quickly. For one, we have Blake's words at a press conference in August in Tashkent which are a reassurance, but also involve his own thinking of what might be expected — but not certainty:

    AP:  Also in Uzbekistan, there have been some reports from Russian media
    recently suggesting the possibility that during the drawdown during 2014
    that military equipment might be left along. What assurances can be
    made making certain that the wrong things do not end in the wrong hands,
    by which I mean weaponry.

    Blake: First of all, the process of allocating Excess Defense Articles
    is only just beginning. We are beginning the consultations on that. It
    won’t be just for Uzbekistan but for all countries partnering on NDN.
    There will be quite detailed conversations with our military people
    based in embassies in each of these posts, with host nation counterparts
    on this thing. With respect to Uzbekistan, I do not think there will be
    any lethal weapons of any kind that will be offered. I think most of
    the kind of things that will be on offer will be military vehicles,
    Humvees, those kind of things. It is in our interests to provide those
    kinds of equipment. Uzbekistan has been a strong supporter of the NDN.
    That has in turn raised their profile with international terrorist
    organizations, who may want to target Uzbekistan in retribution. So, it
    is very much in our interest to help Uzbekistan defend itself against
    such attacks.

    We are certainly prepared to think about how we can do that. I myself
    have been engaged over the last year in the U.S. Congress to get a
    waiver so that we can provide non-lethal military assistance to
    Uzbekistan, even though they have not met a lot of the human rights
    conditions that would allow for more regular military assistance. That
    waiver has been approved. We are providing non-lethal military
    assistance now and will continue to do so, and the EDA process will be
    one way that we could help.

    Around Blake's trip to Uzbekistan in August, the Uzbek regime acquitted one token activist, Shuhrat Rustamov, as Democracy Digest reported
    although of course a dozen or more human rights defenders and
    journalists remain, and many thousands of religious prisoners remain. I
    haven't seen an independent read-out of this civil society meeting,
    which was likely choreographed and selective, but at least it was a
    departure from past years and trips by high-profile US officials who
    avoided civil society.

    The Indiana speech doesn't add anything new with regard to these intentions or the prospects of deployment of a US base, but it certainly doesn't make such speculation seem unreasonable or even "conspiratorial" as Joshua Foust has claimed. It's an evolving situation. Joshua Kucera at the Bug Pit focused on the speculation about whether a base would be negotiated and noted Blake's denials. Although no base was negotiated, he felt the trip was used by Blake to understand Karimov's motivations and intentions for leaving the CSTO. But then Kucera overlooks the real practical goal of the visit, as Democracy Digest pointed out, in describing the "sweetener" to this trip that came with the activist's court acquittal:

    The ruling came as Obama administration
    officials prepare to negotiate an agreement with Islam Karimov,
    Uzbekistan’s authoritarian president, to permit thousands of military
    vehicles, and other equipment to transit from Afghanistan through Uzbek
    territory.

    This week General William Fraser III, the Commander of the U.S. military
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), visited Uzbekistan to meet with
    Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Kamilov and Minister of Defense
    Kabul Berdiev to discuss issues relating to the Northern Distribution
    Network through which cargo transits Uzbekistan en route to
    Afghanistan. Those issues are likely less about supplying troops in their last year and more about bringing the heavy military vehicles out. All in all, the effort is to increase closer cooperation between the Uzbek and US militaries, as this other recent program for fraternization also indicates. 

    The UK has also, of course been very busy doing this same type of negotiations — and this is what prompted the AP reporter to ask whether these transiting vehicles could "fall into the wrong hands," i.e. Uzbek military and/or Interior Ministry troops/police that might use it to oppress their own people as they did in Andijan in 2005 or — I would add — terrorists.  Certainly when *thousands* of vehicles are going from point A through point B, some of them will get lost, stolen, misappropriated, and maybe given away, despite Blake's claims that this will be tightly controlled.

    Kazakhstan also was described in the speech yesterday with a strange amalgam of business and human rights:

    Turning to some of our specific security priorities, we have excellent
    cooperation with Kazakhstan on non-proliferation issues ranging from
    proliferation prevention to improvement of the regulatory framework for
    strategic trade controls, and we look forward to building on our
    cooperation on mutual security concerns with complementing progress in
    human rights, and labor and religious freedoms.

    It's too bad we couldn't have that "religious freedoms" for Uzbekistan, too.

    Then for Kyrgyzstan, hopefully not by design, no mention of human rights but something about "services". Is there a "service" citizens can sign up for to get equal treatment under the law if they are ethnic minorities like Uzbeks?

    In Kyrgyzstan, which also hosts the Manas Transit Center through
    which all of our troops going to Afghanistan pass, we are helping the
    new democratically-elected government to reform the security sector and
    to address issues related to corruption and rule of law. We are also
    helping the government improve services for citizens.

    The NDN continues to be vital despite resumption of relations with Pakistan and truck routes opening:

    The Northern Distribution Network,
    or NDN, is perhaps the clearest example of the benefits to the U.S. our
    security engagement with the Central Asian countries has yielded. Over
    the past year, we have seen how the NDN provided critically important
    alternate routes for our non-lethal cargo transiting to and from
    Afghanistan, particularly when we were experiencing challenging moments
    in our relationship with Pakistan.

    I do wonder a) whether small business get to contract with the NDN or only the big state cronies and b) how that GM plant, which was reducing its output, is doing and c) whether there is any really stringent review going on of the corruption issue in contracts, per the waiver passed last year that still provided for six-month reviews.

    But here's the part that is new — or at least, articulated with more emphasis, and contains the seeds of concerns about further militarization of the relationship with Central Asian dictatorships, and their own further militarization throughout the region. Many people think of 2014 as a kind of cliff, after which US troops come home and only a few remain behind to turn off the lights. But the Administration now describes the post-withdrawal period as a Transformation Decade , and that Transformation Decade actually includes, well, the continued presence of troops:

    In addition to our important bilateral security relationships, the
    United States helps facilitate increased regional coordination and
    support for Afghanistan. The Central Asian countries are vital partners
    in support of the International Security Assistance Force’s efforts
    against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, especially as
    Afghanistan increasingly takes the lead for its own security, as it has
    done now for over 75 percent of its population. None of us has an
    interest in seeing Afghanistan ever again become a platform from which
    Al-Qaida or others could attack our homeland.

    The Central Asian countries will remain important partners as a NATO
    Enduring Presence replaces the ISAF mission in 2014, and as Afghanistan
    embarks upon its Transformation Decade between 2015 and 2024.
    Afghanistan will increase coordination with NATO on internal security
    and with its neighbors on shared issues such as border security and
    combating flows of narcotics and other contraband [emphasis added].

    The United States is likely to maintain a presence in Afghanistan,
    the particulars of which will be negotiated over the next year. We are
    committed to the success of Afghanistan’s security transition and to
    regional security, and we have communicated this commitment to our
    Central Asian partners.

    Certainly there will be a lot less troops in Afghanistan, but I wonder if it's fair to say there will be more military advisor presence then in neighbouring Central Asia — for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Central Asian governmentgs will want to have some US troops as a counter to Russian troops, and as a deterrent to Islamic insurgency springboarding from Afghanistan.

    As for the concept of "Afghanistan as platform for Al Qaeda," I think the way to think about this is more like this: Al Qaeda is the platform from which attacks on our homeland and our diplomats abroad are launched. Or: Al Qaeda is the software that can be installed on any platform to attack our homeland and our diplomats abroad. And it seems pretty permanently installed in Afghanistan.

    (more…)

  • Karimov is Worried About Life After 2014: Would the US Prop Him Up or Leave Him Military Equipment?

    Karimov gov uz
    President Karimov looking chipper in Khorezm. Or at least, after studio retouches. Photo by gov.uz.

    Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov is worried about what will happen after US and NATO troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2014.

    At least, we think he is, but the statement only appears to have been aired on Uzbek-language television and translated by BBC October 11:

    Uzbek President Islom Karimov has
    said his country needs to prepare itself for possible security
    challenges as NATO plans to leave neighbouring Afghanistan in 2014.

    He was speaking on his tour of the northwestern region of Xorazm on 9
    October, in remarks broadcast on Uzbek TV the following day. The
    remarks came in a special TV broadcast detailing the president's visit
    to the region.

    "We need to be prepared. The
    departure of the US troops tomorrow will bring unrest to Afghanistan.
    This will bring us unrest with all sorts of disasters coming close to
    our doorstep. We must not forget the events we went through in the 1990s
    and the 2000s.
    When we say Uzbekistan looks to the future, not just today, this means
    we should build a strong army, one that is second to none. We must give
    this a thought too," the president said, as he spoke to heads of local
    farms.

    But the full text of his speech on the Foreign Ministry and other government websites doesn't contain any remarks about Afghanistan. Instead, the speech is filled up with those sort of fun facts that Soviet-style dictators love to dazzle poor farmers with — "Currently, 88 percent of general schools in the region are outfitted with gyms, compared to the 63 percent back in 2003" or "96,300 young men and women in Khorezm region are currently pursuing
    knowledge and grasping [sic] modern vocations at the ninety-one academic
    lyceums and professional colleges." No doubt to keep their minds off jihad

    There's also a small business boom, the president claims — and who knows, maybe some of them might have a chance to get lucrative contracts from US businesses eager to supply the NDN (but not likely, as they would have to be government approved and probably go to the First Family's cronies in big state corporations).  Who does get lucky from the US government-sponsored "Industry Days"?  As you can see from this slide show on surface contracts in the CENTCOM region, the US military wants to use "locally procured goods". How is that working out? Where could we find this information?

    No doubt Karimov *is* worried about what will happen in 2014, but given all the attacks on NATO by the Taliban and their allies, and the "green on blue" attacks and such, how is the US going to get out, well, gracefully? The GLOC  (ground line of communications) appears to have been restored from Pakistan but of course with lots of protest from parliament (i.e. government proxies), complaints that NATO caused millions of dollars of damage to Pakistani roads, and a view that Islamabad "surrendered" by accepting apologies finally from a civilian and not a military leader, and not even taking fees (after the US complaining about "price-gouging").

    Even though the US and Pakistan have a deal signed through 2015, that doesn't mean the NDN won't go away because Pakistan has showed it can shut off the spigot, and security issues obviously remain. 

    So one can't rule out the idea — although the speculation has subsided — that NATO might need to leave heavy equipment in the neighbouring stans.

    There was some flurry of commentary when Uzbekistan opted out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that it was preparing itself mentally and legally to cooperate with NATO — and even restoration of the US base.

    Certainly that's the frank position of regional analysts like Kazakhstan's Murat Lamulin:

    The forthcoming withdrawal of the Western coalition troops from
    Afghanistan and possible deployment of weapons and, probably, U.S.
    operating bases on the territory of some Central Asian countries is
    creating a new situation in the region. It is in this context that one
    should probably view Tashkent’s decision to “suspend” its membership in
    the Collective Security Treaty Organization, announced in late June this
    year. The CSTO Charter prohibits the deployment of third countries’
    military bases on the territories of the allied countries. Uzbekistan’s
    withdrawal removes legal barriers for it to host any military hardware
    of NATO, including weapons that NATO forces would like to leave on their
    way from Afghanistan.

    This piece on a Russian media-sponsored site just makes common sense — if the US faces problems as it withdraws from Afghanistan or experiences problems again with Pakistan, and if Uzbekistan is worried about defense, then it is fast, cheap and easy for the US to leave these heavy lethal vehicles in Uzbekistan — although of course there's the obstacle that the NDN agreements provide only for non-lethal deliveries. (I wonder if there is a loophole here — the agreements were for equipment going in — what about equipment coming out? The agreement was signed with the stans last June to take the equipment out.)

    Of course, Karimov is all about playing the great powers off against each other in classic fashion. Even though ultimately Karimov pulled out of the CSTO in late June, when he met with Putin in early June, the two leaders said NATO's withdrawal would mean they would step up their own cooperation, uznews.net reported.

    The Uzbek president stressed that the withdrawal of foreign military
    personnel from Afghanistan before a competent army is set up may
    destabilise the country and the region as a whole.


    “If this problem is not resolved, if it is not fully exposed as it truly
    is, I think many things will unravel later, and we will simply miss the
    moment,” Karimov said.

    “This directly concerns the security of the Russian Federation itself.
    Cooperation with our Uzbekistani partners is extremely important for
    us,” the Russian president told a news conference

    But as uznews.net pointed out, "On the same day when the Uzbek and Russian presidents met, Nato in
    Brussels stroke a deal with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the
    transit of military freight from Afghanistan, UzDaily.uz website has
    reported." 

    There's also discussion that the US might sell weapons to Uzbekistan (It seems much more likely that they'd just leave military equipment behind in Uzbekistan). Columbia University's Alexander Cooley has suggested in The New York Times that the US would sell weapons to Tashkent:

    Most controversially of all, NATO and the Central Asian states are still
    negotiating over the potential transfer of military equipment, used by
    coalition forces in Afghanistan, to Central Asian governments’ security
    services, which have a bloody human rights record.


    In January, the Obama administration lifted a ban on foreign military
    sales to Uzbekistan, on national security grounds, to allow for sales of
    counterterrorism equipment. American officials insist that such future
    transfers will include only nonlethal items, but the Uzbek government
    has long sought items like armored personnel carriers, helicopters and
    drones, which could be used to suppress protests.

    Joshua Foust naturally finds this a "conspiracy" to even entertain this idea:

    There is no basis in US law, official US policy, or anything US
    officials have said about their plans for the regime, that indicate even
    a distant interest in selling weapons to Tashkent.

    So what? Laws get changed — as we saw the law change last year barring military aid to Uzbekistan due to the Andijan massacre in 2005 and its appalling human rights record. Exigencies exist, emergencies happen, whatever.  Foust notes that the Uzbeks start high and negotiate down and that Cooley is just reporting rumors from his trips to Uzbekistan.

    At least Cooley travels to the region, unlike Foust, and what he reports tracks with what regional analysts are saying.  I can't imagine why anyone would be so adamant about the US *not* doing this, and in such a fury to slam colleagues in the field for reporting the matter-of-fact horse-trading likely going on. What's this really about? Often these rampages of Foust's seem to be only about trying to position himself as a quotable expert to get more media attention and possibly some kind of better job than "fellow" at ASP — in Obama II's State Department where Sen. John Kerry or some other comrade could be secretary of state.

    The venerable Walter Pincus speaks up against doing business with tyrants and quotes former CENTCOM head Adm. William Fallon:

    “We would envision, and this is already with the agreement of the
    Afghan government, that this place would be the enduring facility . . .
    within that country by which we would provide continuing support to
    that nation, and hopefully be able to use that facility for other things
    in the region.”

    Pincus concludes: "Let’s hope those “other things” don’t include military operations to
    keep in power Washington’s current “allies,” such as the current rulers
    in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan." 

    And sudden Foust tut kak tut  — blasting Pincus for his "curious bit of hand-wringing" and supposed exaggeration. Foust converts Pincus' legitimate concern about helping to keep these tyrants in power — especially given already-existing efforts that bolst them, with this:   "where on earth would he get the impression that anyone in Washington
    wants to defend Nazarbayev or Berdimuhamedov against a coup?

    But there's a difference between the US siding with Berdymukhamedov or Nararbayev or Karimov in a coup where they faced challenges from, say, insiders in the security of military sectors or oligarchs — and the US helping these regimes fight off terrorists that might or might not be actual Islamist terrorists.  The US would probably not mix in if, say, Russia-based Uzbek tycoon Alisher Usmanov decided he wanted to replace Karimov — that would be fighting the Kremlin, too. But if some band of terrorists with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Afghan police or Taliban launched some raid to destabilize Karimov, sure, the existing US special forces who already advise Tashkent and have a closer relationship now with the Karimov government might intervene in a pinch — we don't know. We can't be sure. There's nothing wrong with pointing up this scenario as one of the many bad things to come after 2014.

     


    The US Army helped build the railway to Mazar-e-Sharif to ship supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan. Video by American Forces Network Afghanistan.

  • Saddest Song in the World on NATO.int

    Afghan future
    Future of Afghanistan after 2014?

    Whoever wrote the soundtrack tune for this upbeat NATO propaganda film on the future of Afghanistan, it's the saddest-sounding song in the world, and somehow their sorrow must have seeped through…

    Look at the scenes about 3:53 where there is just the soundtrack, the jingling of bells, an a man and his son walking in the marketplace, and then at 6:43 with women washing clothes.

    Mark the pictures and names of the people featured in this clip — will they survive? Will they remain in Afghanistan? Will they be safe? Will they be able to do their work?

    Truly, the soundtrack is sad… perhaps it could mash up with the song from The Road to Perdition called Road to Chicago, one of the most hauntingly beautiful sad songs of Hollywood, where after the family is murdered by Italian mobsters, the protagonist and his son escape the mafia by driving to Chicago…

    Or perhaps it could mash up with Chris Isaac's Wicked Games…

    "People are so much longing for justice, for democracy, for good governance," says Ahmad Nader Nader, Chairman, Free and fair election foundation of Afghanistan, in this video clip.

    Judge for yourself how you think the NATO propaganda program is going, and listen to the soundtrack on this clip on social media, too.

    NATO should put embed/share codes on their videos if they are serious about social media. What would be the down side?

     

     

  • HRW Twists into a Pretzel to Make Everything in Afghanistan NATO’s Fault

    NATO Chicago
    Anti-NATO protester in Chicago this week. Photo by Michael Kappel.

    I've blogged this week about how Human Rights Watch's front page in recent days differed little from Kremlin propaganda — and indeed reinforced it, as we can see on RT, the Kremlin's mouthpiece.

    My blog was reprinted in the Russian newspaper inosmi.ru with the usual raft of hate comments from the FSB bots and the real people who make up the "aggressively obedient majority" Putin base in Russia.

    I've been watching to see what HRW would do to update its website from the May 14 week-long top story about NATO's victims in Libya in keeping with "the line" I was told they'd be taking with the NATO summit, which was to raise women's rights issues.

    Something told me they wouldn't be raising this issue like Laura Bush raised it in the Washington Post yesterday — focusing on the Taliban's original threat and impending threat to women in Afghanistan. Of course, the former First Lady is utterly (and rightly) discredited in the eyes of HRW and other "progressives" because they see her associated with her husband's unjust war in Iraq, which in fact took resources away from the fight in Afghanistan.

    I wondered how HRW would address the fundamental challenge of the Taliban, however, even if they were highlighting all last week NATO's victims in Libya — singing along with the choir of Code Pink and RT. Of course, at the UN, we've seen Russia cry tears exclusively for NATO's victims in Libya, and not the victims they helped create in Syria and elsewhere.

    So here it is, NATO:  Rights Key to Afghanistan's Security, a work of art by "progressives" twisting themselves into a pretzel to figure out how they can "Blame NATO First" in a situation essentially created by the Taliban and its allies in Al Qaeda and Pakistan's ISI.

    If the Taliban threatens women's rights after NATO troops pull out in 2014, HRW piously intones, this will be "NATO's legacy". Not the fault of the Taliban and its guest Al Qaeda which NATO went in to fight in the first place, but NATO's fault:

    “Many Afghans worry that NATO’s departure from Afghanistan will put basic rights under increasing threat,” said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. “Unless urgent steps are taken to address Afghanistan’s governance crisis, NATO’s legacy may be a country run by abusive warlords and unaccountable security forces.”

    Abusive warlords who commit MOST of the killings and unaccountable security forces that seem to be supported by those warlords or Pakistan's ISI — mentioned secondarily, after NATO.

    So let's translate that into some frank talk: "NATO, you are pulling out of Afghanistan because your domestic populations can't stomach this war anymore with all the deaths of their own soldiers, some of them responsible for atrocities like the killing of Afghan villagers, and inability to defeat an insurgency on their own mountainous turf, so we're going to blame you if that insurgency overruns all the Western-funded programs to support development and human rights…because we can. Because you're near, and they are far."

    And not surprisingly, in its statement, HRW is focusing on the corrupt and mismanaged government of Hamid Karzai, and calling for monitoring not of the Taliban's crimes against humanity — the many suicide bombings, militant attacks on civilians, throwing of acid on girls in schools — you know, all those really monstrous atrocities — but is calling for monitoring of the Afgan National Army, which of course is likely to be corrupt and abusive, as all things run by corrupt and abusive client states of the US are corrupt and abusive. But it's like the old days in Latin America, when the left steadfastly refused to see or condemn the violent communist guerillas threatening the right-wing dictators and helping to enable their abuses while committing their own human rights violations.

    In the old days, Americas Watch, as the Latin American program of Human Rights Watch was called them, would carefully produce such reports as Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides of the Conflict in El Salvador — or Nicaragua or Guatamala. That kind of balanced perspective has long since been overthrown at HRW as it has migrated to the "progressive" left in the last decade, however.

    If they were to produce a report they were featuring today that had "violations of the laws of war by both sides of the conflict" for Afghanistan, it would show a scale utterly weighted down on one side by the Taliban and the Haqanni network as they commit 85 percent of the killings of civilians in the war — i.e. it's like a kind of civil war underway that NATO only occasionally weighs in on, and tries to prop up one side which is corrupt but nominally secular and developing.

    Again, I totally realize why HRW groups get into these pretzel-twists. They start with a viewpoint that international humanitarian law is something by which mainly states are bound, not non-state actors as such. That is, yes, non-state actors are increasingly found guilty one by one of such abuses at the International Criminal Court ("violation" is the term for when states don't break international law; "abuse" is the term when non-state actors don't follow its principles.)

    But the center of gravity of the international justice jet-set is to look at states, not non-state actors, because they sign human rights treaties, terrorists don't, and they can get at them easily and effortlessly through the free Western media. The very notion of terrorism is a "destruction" of human rights, say some HRW divisions in their occasional and short statements on the subject. No need to keep stating the obvious — terrorists are bad — because what media will ever cover you then? Better to focus on liberal Western states that might not be fighting terrorism "the right way".

    That center of gravity always tilts them to hate America first and hate NATO first in a situation like Afghanistan, even with the overwhelming awful atrocities of the enemies of NATO — and all of us.

    Increasingly over the years I've come to a depressing realization about these thinkers and doers in the international human rights movement — it was never really about international human rights for them; human rights were always just a cover, a shield, a way-station, on their way to full-blown leftist and even Marxist radical agendas. That accounts for the awfulness of Amnesty International today, that has totally left behind its roots in concern for "prisoners of conscience" which were overwhelmingly produced by the communist countries. That accounts for how HRW has lost its way, to the point where Ken Roth now calls for pre-emptive credits of faith for "democratically-elected" Islamist governments.

    The blood just doesn't get flowing with the same vigour for HRW when it comes to condemning all kinds of murderous non-state actors because they can simply be more successful in getting liberal media coverage and reactions from Western governments than they can of some deadly, entrenched medieval movement like the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

    Imagine a world if these groups and their mainstream media friends could use their incredible power to name and shame the Taliban, which is newly-PR conscious. Oh, but that would be simplistic and even wrong, like the Kony viral video, hmmm? That might *shudder* put them in the same place as the Christian right, eh?

    So they don't even try.

    I wish Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty would cover the NATO protests with a little more thought and depth than merely cutting and pasting the various idiotic one-sided anti-NATO slogans from lefty groups like The World Can't Wait. RFE/RL prides itself on being a news outlet and not a propaganda outlet, as does Voice of America, but increasingly one sees especially the younger correspondents of these US-funded stations simply replicating the hard-left Zeitgeist and not framing the issue with a larger advocacy even of the more centrist Obama Administration. I suppose as a politician influenced by his old and current DSA ties, even though this aspect of his biography has been studious scrubbed, Obama personally believes that all US wars are evil, capitalist, imperialist and racist inherently by nature and should just be closed down and war funds converted to human needs. Obviously he has had to temper his youthful "progressivism" now that his "community-organizing" has a national stage. My hope is that he would be tempered by reality when I voted for him.

    Yes, some of what the US does is "wrong and immoral," in the words of anti-NATO protesters quoted by RFE/RL, and we should do better, because the world expects us to be better and we are held to a higher standard. And yes, the drones program has involved killing of innocent civilians who haven't been compensated because this program is run under the CIA, which keeps it secret and won't talk to the victims' lawyers. So that needs to change.

    Meanwhile, the antiwar movement is as one-sided as it was in the 1960s and 1980s, focusing myopically only on US and Western crimes. As I noted, the Taliban kills the overwhelming majority of the civilians in Afghanistan. What's the left's plan when NATO leaves and the Taliban overruns Kabul and destroys secularism again?

    I'm not suggesting we should stay, but I want to hear the left's plan for opposing terrorism in a world where Russia thwarts our efforts and dominates countries in Central Asia that are poor and vulnerable to spillover from the war in Afghanistan. I want a different world, too, where people don't mindlessly blame the US in wishing that "people aren't slaughtered in Afghanistan and Iraq and around the world just to make banks and just to make corporations rich." That's patently ridiculous. We've only impoverished our own country with these wars and they don't enrich banks in the simplistic manner in which the shriekers claim — the terrorists and their supporters in Iran and other authoritarian regimes are the source of the problem. Again, what indeed is the left's plan for addressing this menace? What situation just like Vietnam and Cambodia are we waiting to see replicated in Central Asia and unfold around Afghanistan after our defeated troops leave?